International Dialogue
Volume 7

Article 4

11-2017

Agamben’s Comic Messianism: Giorgio Agamben: Beyond the
Threshold of Deconstruction; Agamben and Politics: A Critical
Introduction
Anthony Curtis Adler

Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.unomaha.edu/id-journal
Part of the Ethics and Political Philosophy Commons, International and Area Studies Commons,
International and Intercultural Communication Commons, International Relations Commons, and the
Political Theory Commons

Recommended Citation
Adler, Anthony Curtis (2017) "Agamben’s Comic Messianism: Giorgio Agamben: Beyond the Threshold of
Deconstruction; Agamben and Politics: A Critical Introduction," International Dialogue: Vol. 7, Article 4.
DOI: https://doi.org/10.32873/uno.dc.ID.7.1.1138
Available at: https://digitalcommons.unomaha.edu/id-journal/vol7/iss1/4

This Review Essay is brought to you for free and open
access by the The Goldstein Center for Human Rights at
DigitalCommons@UNO. It has been accepted for
inclusion in International Dialogue by an authorized editor
of DigitalCommons@UNO. For more information, please
contact unodigitalcommons@unomaha.edu.

ID: International Dialogue, A Multidisciplinary Journal of World Affairs 7 2017

Review Essay
Agamben’s Comic Messianism
Giorgio Agamben: Beyond the Threshold
of Deconstruction
Kevin Attell. New York: Fordham University Press, 2014.
328pp.

Agamben and
Introduction

Politics:

A

Critical

Sergei Prozorov. Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press,
2014. 208pp.

Anthony Curtis Adler*
The publication of Giorgio Agamben’s The Use of Bodies in 2014, followed the next year
by Adam Kotsko’s English translation, marked a momentous event in the history of more
recent continental thought, bringing to a close one of the most far reaching and ambitious
scholarly and philosophical labors of the twentieth century. Initiated in 1995 with Homo
Sacer: Sovereign Power and Bare Life, Agamben’s project, named after the first volume,
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would come to comprise nine separate books, published at fairly regular intervals over the
course of twenty years. While neither Kevin Attell’s Giorgio Agamben: Beyond the
Threshold of Deconstruction (BTD) nor Sergei Prozorov’s Agamben and Politics: A
Critical Introduction (AP) were able to take advantage of the appearance of the last volume
of Homo Sacer, they both benefit from an understanding of the scope of Agamben’s work
and thought that has only recently become possible. Indeed, these books represent two of
the most compelling attempts to offer a comprehensive account of Agamben’s work that is
sensitive to its range and subtlety, recognizing the complex interactions between political,
philosophical, theological, linguistic and poetological lines of inquiry.
Kevin Attell’s Giorgio Agamben: Beyond the Threshold of Deconstruction aims
to trace out the “philosophical gigantomachy” between Agamben and Derrida. Seeking to
show “the extent and the significance of Agamben’s debate with deconstruction,” BTD is
written from the conviction that “Agamben views deconstruction as perhaps the most
significant body of philosophical thought in the postwar period, the work against which he
must continually measure his own” (Attell 2015: 3). This is, indeed, a task of great
significance for understanding Agamben’s own project, which, as Attell convincingly
argues, involves an engagement with Derrida’s thought that, first formulated in 1966 and
1968 (just around the time of Derrida’s own annus mirabilis), will “continue to develop
and deepen over the course of the following decades, sometimes overtly and pointedly,
sometimes much more obliquely and, as it were, esoterically” (Attell 2015: 1–2). Beyond
the Threshold of Deconstruction indeed provides a helpful remedy for the tendency among
many of Agamben’s readers, led astray by the manifestly political character of Homo
Sacer, to neglect the philosophical (as well as theological and linguistic) horizon within
which its political questions become legible. Attell is hardly alone in insisting that
Agamben’s work must be understood in the context of twentieth-century French
philosophy, yet he goes further in presenting the gigantomachia between Derrida and
Agamben, both of whom undertake a radical critique of metaphysics, as a powerful frame
for understanding post-war continental thought.
Beyond merely considering Agamben’s explicit engagements with Derrida, Attell
also juxtaposes and contrasts their readings of key texts by Saussure, Benveniste,
Heidegger, Husserl, Plato, Aristotle, Benjamin, and Schmitt (Attell 2015: 4). This second
methodological strategy forms the substance of Attell’s book, making possible a much
more richly nuanced account of the gigantomachia. Were Attell to restrict himself to the
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first strategy, it might seem as if, with his death, Derrida become less and less significant
for Agamben, despite the fact that, in the seminars from 2001–2002 published as The Beast
and the Sovereign, Derrida would offer an explicit critique of Agamben’s project. Derrida
is entirely absent from The Kingdom and the Glory, The Sacrament of Language, Opus
Dei, The Highest Poverty, and The Use of Bodies. Agamben’s turn to Foucault and his
explicit incorporation into Homo Sacer of an archeological and genealogical method,
together with his move away from the more playful and experimental approach of earlier
works, such as the Idea of Prose, itself suggests a repudiation of the deconstructive current
in post-war French thought. Moreover, Agamben’s explicit engagements with Derrida
seems, from the beginning, to involve oversimplifying the thought of his opponent to the
point of caricature. Having soon realized that a Derridean battle against Derrida can’t be
won, Agamben seeks from the outset to set the rules of the game. Often taking the form of
an unabashedly distant reading, his critique of Derrida depends, with a kind of tautological
necessity, on the refusal to enter into the endless process of signification.
Each of BTD’s six chapters investigates a different textual constellation. The first
chapter argues that Saussure plays a no less fundamental role for Agamben than for
Derrida, while also offering a nuanced account of the very different approaches that they
both take to him. This culminates in a wonderfully insightful reading of Agamben’s
attempt, in Stanzas, to approach the “enigma of language” from the viewpoint of the Sphinx
rather than Oedipus (Attell 2015: 35). For Agamben, Attell shows, Derrida remains
“confined to the Oedipal understanding of the enigma, an understanding of language
fundamentally as code,” against which Agamben will seek to restore the metaphysical
dimension of semiotics by conceiving of the sign not fundamentally as a “plexus” of
difference but as a positive unity of signifier and signified (Attell 2015: 37).
Reading Agamben’s Infancy and History in conjunction with Derrida’s early
writings on Husserl, the second chapter turns to the “voice,” offering an insightful account
of the opposition between Derrida and Agamben’s critiques of “phonocentrism.” Whereas
Derrida regards the phonē as a means by which metaphysics, in a gesture repeated from
Plato to Rousseau, Saussure, Levi-Strauss and even Husserl and Heidegger, tries to secure
presence, Agamben identifies the “Voice as the site of a metaphysical negativity rather
than a presence” (Attell 2015: 81). This chapter also includes an excursus on Émile
Benveniste, and his theory of the “shifter.” This sheds much light on the French linguist’s
significance Agamben, whose most fundamental onto-logical thesis depends on
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Benveniste’s account of the linguistics of the utterance, and also deepens the account of
Agamben and Derrida’s very different reception of structuralism (Attell 2015: 67).
The third chapter addresses potenza and différance—keywords, respectively, of
Agamben and Derrida’s thought. The concept of potentiality (Potenza), Attell argues,
emerges from Agamben’s own attempt, in texts written from the early-80s up to 1990 to
come to terms with his relation to Derridean deconstruction. This account of potentiality,
and the complex interplay of dunamis and energeia—concepts at the very core of
Aristotle’s thought—underwrites the critique of sovereignty developed in Homo Sacer. For
indeed there can be no critique of the Western politics without rethinking the most basic
concepts in terms of which relations of power are articulated. In the following passage,
Attell offers an incisive account of Agamben’s “first-philosophical project”:
In Homo Sacer, Agamben says of the “constitutive ambiguity of the
Aristotelian theory of dunamis/energeia” that “it is not [the result] of a
certain indecisiveness or, worse, contradiction in the philosopher’s
thought but [arises] because potentiality and actuality are simply the two
faces of the sovereign self-grounding of Being.” This sovereign selfgrounding is the “24 centuries”-long impasse that Agamben’s thought
seeks to break, for rather than thinking the meaning of being or even the
passage from potentiality to actuality, the ultimate task at hand is to break
the sovereign structure that holds us in ban of being, to “think the
existence of potentiality without any relation to Being in the form of
actuality.” (Attell 2015: 99–100)
Far from engaging in an endless critique of traditional ontology by fixing its
attention on the marginal moments of metaphysical texts in which the attempted closure of
meaning betrays itself, Agamben proposes to achieve, by way of passing through the
closure of Aristotelian ontology, a new ontology, and hence also a new politics. Yet this
new ontology and politics—an ontology and politics of potentiality—is in truth an antiontology and an anti-politics; a “dunamology” or “potentiology” (Attell 2015: 100).
Yet one might suspect that, in just this way, Agamben’s project remains
terminologically identical, and in a certain respect dependent, on the tradition that it sets
out to overcome. It is not so much a new world, as the old world with a twist; but a twist
by which everything becomes new. For if différance and potenza are the respective
keywords of Agamben and Derrida, there is nevertheless a decided lack of symmetry:
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whereas différance is a neologism, involving a clever typographic innovation to call
attention to a graphic dimension of signification irreducible to the phonetic, potenza is a
simple Italian world, derived from the problematic Latinate translation of the Greek
dunamis. Thus we find, hidden behind Derrida and Agamben’s gigantomachia, the
unrealized contest between Heidegger, who would never cease inventing new terminology
to avoid the traps of metaphysics, and Benjamin, whose stylistic powers had nothing to do
with pure terminological invention.
In the second part of the third chapter, Attell turns to Agamben’s subtle and
complex critique of Derrida’s terminological innovations, including, in the first instance,
différance. Derrida will, as it were, shirk back from an experience of potential that appears
in his grammatological discourse; rather than succeeding in thinking this “potentiological
repressed,” and indeed thinking it through, he will instead decide to “dwell at” the
“crossroads” of the aporia of self-reference that différance makes manifest. It is in this way
that the “early grammatological inquiry” leads to deconstruction. Yet this step forward,
into the terrain of an endless inquiry, is in fact a step backwards (Attell 2015: 105). As
Agamben writes in a passage that Attell cites:
Grammatology was forced to become deconstruction in order to avoid
this paradox (or, more precisely, to seek to dwell in it correctly); this is
why it renounced any attempt to proceed by decisions about meaning.
But in its original intention, grammatology is not a theory of polysemy
or a doctrine of the transcendence of meaning; it has as its object…a
radicalization of the problem of self-reference that calls into question and
transforms the very concept of meaning grounding Western logic.
(Agamben 1999b: 213; Attell 2015: 105)
The gist of Agamben’s critique of deconstruction, the “nucleus of a critique that
Agamben will never fundamentally retract,” is that Derrida thinks his way to the outer limit
of Saussurian semiology, but remains enclosed within a semiological understanding of
language” (Attell 2015: 2).
The third chapter brings to a close the first part of BTD, which, dedicated to the
“pre-history” of Homo Sacer, focuses on those key concepts that, developed in Agamben’s
writings from the 70s and the 80s, are at the foundation of his later, more explicitly political
work. The second part, titled “Strategy without Finality or Means without End,” explores
the political turn in both thinkers, contrasting their approaches to a range of more explicitly
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political concepts. These include, in chapter four, sovereignty, law, and violence; in chapter
five, the problem of the relation of the animal and the human; and finally, in chapter six,
the nature of messianic time. The ingenuous organization of the book into these two parts,
allowing for an account of Agamben’s thought that is at once systematically and
chronologically coherent, is one of the great virtues of Attell’s book: it offers a
compellingly synoptic and coherent interpretation of Agamben, whose work is all too often
regarded as eclectic and disjoin, as well as of Derrida. Against the suggestion that both are
unsystematic and tactical thinkers, Attell maintains that they “propose and consistently
maintain certain central theoretical positions” (Attell 2015: 4).
This systematic intention is refreshing. Yet I question the impression of parity to
which it leads. Far from being a neutral term, indicating a strategy of interpretation that can
be applied to their works as if from a certain position of objectivity, concepts like
systematicity and structural coherence call attention to precisely what is at stake between
them. This is because every disagreement between them can be seen to derive from a
difference in strategies of reading: whereas Agamben’s readings almost always aim toward
a systematic closure that, in its self-exhaustion, points beyond itself, Derrida seeks to affirm
a radical openness to which metaphysics, with its desire for presence and closure, has
closed itself off. It is for precisely this reason that Agamben needs Derrida: deconstruction
comes to serve as a master signifier that refers to, and indeed refers to as a totality, the
entire set of possible non-totalizing readings of the metaphysical corpus. Somewhat
analogous to the set of all sets, it sums up all the ways in which metaphysics can stave off
the exhaustion of its concepts, continuing to tarry at the threshold: the totality of series of
readings generated by a non-systematic principal. Yet the set of all sets is, of course, selfcontradictory; it can only be encountered by a thinking that is able to live with
contradiction.
Agamben’s entire project thus depends on what we might call a paradoxical
structuralism, or, better, a structuralism of paradox: it demands an ultimately referential
(and hence quasi-systematic) account of the paradox of self-reference. This could not be
more different than deconstruction, which, far from contenting itself with a description of
paradoxical structures, seeks to experience paradox as the very play of signification
through the labor of reading. Yet in this way there is a certain sleight of hand involved in
using the word ‘deconstruction’ to bring Agamben and Derrida into a polemical dialogue.
Whereas Derrida regards deconstruction as a term that must be written under erasure, for
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Agamben deconstruction serves as the master signifier for a paradoxical thought, that,
unable to give a systematic account of its structure, is forced into a never-ending task of
thinking about that which it can never think through. At the point where they seem to
meet—when Agamben speaks of “deconstruction”—the distance between them is, in fact,
most extreme.
Along these same lines, one might wonder whether the notion of a gigantomachia
does justice to the debate between Derrida and Agamben—or whether this is even a debate,
and not, rather, a collision between thoughts that, while certain standing in an intimate
proximity, remain fundamentally opaque to each other. Neither Derrida nor Agamben are,
in any simple sense, polemical thinkers, and perhaps the latter even less than the former.
Nevertheless, Agamben needed to approach Derrida polemically: he could not digest and
assimilate Derrida, taking him up into his own thought, in the manner that he does with
Foucault and even Deleuze. He could only deal with deconstruction by regarding it as the
counterpart, or even the antithesis, of his own thought. Taking Agamben’s polemical
impulse at face value, Attell does not always seem to fully appreciate either the strangeness
of this gesture, and of the need that underlies it, or the deeper dissonance between Derrida
and Agamben’s thought. This dissonance appears with particular clarity in the coda, when
Attell discusses the concept of play.
For Derrida, Attell explains, the play of differences, “the play that worries the
hairline fractures and fissures of every structure, the unstoppable play that fatally
undermines any appeal to a solid, pure presence,” is the “key gesture in undermining any
and all appeals to—and ultimately all desires for—an origin or originary state or being”
(Attell 2015: 258). It is, in other words, the radical disruption of presence; the play of the
signifier is what always scuttles the closure of the system. For Agamben, by contrast, play
is the “messianic operator” that brings the “time of the now,” and hence the time of
inoperativity, of use without ownership, to fruition, by deactivating the law and opening
“human action to a truly postjuridical condition animated by a pure Gewalt, a Gewalt
purified of the law” (Attell 2015: 262). For as Agamben writes in a passage from State of
Exception cited at length by Attell in the last page of Beyond the Threshold of
Deconstruction:
Humanity will play with law just as children play with disused objects,
not in order to restore them to their canonical use but to free them from
it for good. What is found after the law is not a more proper and original
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use value that precedes the law, but a new use that is born only after
it.…This liberation is the task of study, or of play. And this studious play
is the passage that allows us to arrive at that justice that one of
Benjamin’s posthumous fragments defines as a state of the world in
which the world appears as a good that absolutely cannot be appropriated
or made juridical. (Agamben 2005: 64; Attell 2015: 262)
With these different senses of play played against each other, and with the stakes
so high, I cannot help but feel disquieted by Attell’s reluctance to subject Agamben’s
formulations, and his own reformulations of these, to a greater critical scrutiny. There
seems to be something remarkably unplayful, if not joyless, about Agamben’s play, which
has indeed been tasked with a paradoxical operation of disoperativity; the work of
unworking every work, and liberating man to his essential freedom from every proper task.
This unplayful play has a very concrete correlate: Agamben’s own magnum opus, the nine
volumes of Homo Sacer—assuming, at least, that we are able to take these as in some sense
already performing the operation of disoperativity. This unplayful play is a play that never
ceases to point beyond itself to a time in which its true and essential playfulness would be
fulfilled.
Derrida’s play, by contrast, is a play that is itself somehow experienced, that plays
itself out, in the very act of deconstructive reading. It is a play that is happening in the
irreparably fractured now in all its playfulness, and not a mere prelude. For what else is
deconstruction doing than putting the text to a use for which it was not intended; turning
it, through a kind of catachresis, into an object of play? But if this is so, it suggests that
Agamben’s critique of Derrida must be the opposite of what it seems: it is not just that
Derrida’s play fails to lead “beyond an affirmation (whether resigned or joyous) of the
impossibility of an original purity and presence,” and thus remains no more than one half
of the messianic project (Attell 2015: 258–60). The deeper problem is that the interminable
labor of deconstruction, unfolding as a manner of reading that enters into the play of
signification, presents itself already as genuinely playful, and even, in this sense, satisfying.
Against this “false messianism,” which can only end up playing out the structure of
oppression within which it remains trapped, Agamben will insist, in a manner that recalls
Plato’s Laws, on a serious play; a play that is a prelude, a foreplay, a preparation. This
should not surprise us: the play that unworks work, that puts work out of work, could not
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be anything else than a play that unplays play—or indeed, play and work must themselves
collapse into a threshold of indistinction.
Sergei Prozorov’s Agamben and Politics: A Critical Introduction covers much the
same ground as BTD. Demonstrating a deep knowledge of the range of Agamben’s
writings, Prozorov also strives to give a coherent and largely unifying account of his
thought. Agamben and Politics is, moreover, similarly organized around a chronological
arrangement of thematic clusters, with chapters devoted to animality, language and the
voice, law and sovereignty, and history. Nevertheless, AP is aimed at a very different
audience than BDT: whereas Attell, an associate professor of English at Cornell University,
targets his book principally at those for whom Derrida is familiar enough to serve as a point
of reference, Prozorov, who teaches in the Department of Political and Economic Studies
at the University of Helsinki, writes with a very different audience in mind. He seeks to
make Agamben comprehensible as a political thinker to those who are inclined to doubt
that Agamben’s “erudite, elliptical and admittedly arcane writings” could be relevant for
the politics of the present. His book, he explains, is “an invitation to read Agamben that
ventures to demonstrate the originality of his political thought in the contemporary
theoretical and sociopolitical context, its capacity to disturb out familiar assumptions about
politics, provoke unease about the political positions we uphold and offer new perspectives
on the key political issues of our times” (Prozorov 2014: 1). To this end it seeks to show
that while politics is of central significance for Agamben’s philosophy, it is “a different
kind of politics”—and one which, by reinterpreting seemingly non-political phenomena, is
“able both to problematize the entire political tradition which we continue to inhabit and
advance a thoroughgoing alternative that seeks to deactivate this tradition… render it
inoperative” (Prozorov 2014: 2). In precisely this way, AP and BTD complement each
other, together offering a fuller picture of Agamben’s thought.
The guiding claim of AP is that Agamben’s philosophy has an essentially comic
character. The first chapter, titled “All’s Well That Ends Well: Agamben’s Comic Politics,”
is devoted to this provocative claim. Starting out from Heidegger’s analysis of mood
(Stimmung), Prozorov goes on to argue that Agamben’s thought depends on a comic mood.
This might seem like a bizarre claim; as Prozorov himself notes, there certainly doesn’t
seem to be anything comic about concentration camps, the state of exception, homo sacer
and the Muselmann (Prozorov 2014: 12). Yet precisely by insisting on the comic mood,
Prozorov seeks to resist the dominant tragic and pessimistic interpretation of Agamben’s
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work. This interpretation, he notes, has led commentators such as Ernesto Laclau, William
Connolly, and Andreas Kalyvas to regard Agamben as a purely negative thinker who paints
a bleak picture of Western political history as an unremitting march toward the catastrophe
prefigured in its origins while refusing to grant that any form of voluntarist political
activism possible in the present could offer meaningful resistance (Prozorov 2014: 13).
Against this, Prozorov writes:
In contrast to this tragic pathos…Agamben’s politics may be understood
as comic, evidently not in the sense of being funny or humorous, but
rather in the sense espoused by classical aesthetics. Whereas tragedy is
marked by a pacific beginning after which things go wrong and end
badly, comedy begins with various misfortunes only to lead at the end to
what Agamben refers to as “happy life”.…It is specifically the
movement from the misfortunes or mishaps at the beginning to happiness
at the end that defines comedy. (Prozorov 2014: 14)
Prozorov goes on to provide a close reading of the argument of End of the Poem,
showing how Agamben conceives of the comic character of Dante’s Divine Comedy in
terms of the categories of guilt and innocence. The fundamental difference between the
tragic worldview of Ancient Greece and the “comic logic made possible by the historical
event of Christianity” is that whereas tragedy involves a “conflict between the subjective
innocence of the hero and his objectively attributed guilt, whereby the just end up guilty
despite themselves” the logic of comedy “consists in the overcoming of the subjectivity
guilt that ensures a ‘prosperous and pleasant ending’” (Prozorov 2014: 15). Yet things get
somewhat more complicated. Through the doctrine of original sin, Christianity ends up
taking over the tragic view, regarding postlapsarian nature as itself inherently guilty.
Nevertheless, Christ’s passion itself profoundly changes this situation by “transforming
natural guilty into personal expiation and an irreconcilable objective conflict into a
personal matter.” Indeed: “Transforming the conflict between natural guilt and personal
innocence into the division between natural innocence and personal guilt, Christ’s death
thus liberates man from tragedy and makes comedy possible” (Agamben 1999a: 12–13;
Prozorov 2014: 15). Dante carries through this comic reversal by extending it even to erotic
experience, which remains the last reserve of tragedy. This reversal takes the form of a
displacement of a logic of guilt by a logic of shame; whereas tragic heroes such as Oedipus
are kept from “assuming their shame” due to their sense of subjective innocence, the comic
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character, renouncing “every claim to personal innocence as well as every attempt to return
to the Edenic state” is able in turn to fully take on the “fracture between the natural and the
personal” within their own existence. Comedy thus achieves a redemption that is
fundamentally different than tragic redemption: redeemed is not the individual person or
subject, who remains a mere mask, but the “‘creature’ in its natural innocence.” Resisting
identification with this mask, a “foreign person” that is the product of external forces—an
irreparable alienation, as it were—, the comic character reclaims “its natural innocence
while leaving its guilty person to the external forces of the law” (Prozorov 2014: 16).
Prozorov deserves great credit not only for calling attention to the “comic”
dimension of Agamben, but indeed stressing its absolute centrality for understanding his
thought as a whole, including, not least of all, the works written after his so-called political
turn. My own reading of Agamben, indeed, advances through a very different path, and yet
ends up reaching a similar destination. In the conclusion of “Deconfabulation: Agamben’s
Italian Categories and the Impossibility of Experience,” I write:
The comic, which is always at risk of being intoned tragicomically, is
the shibboleth at the threshold of Agamben’s fabulous undertaking.…Of
Dante, Agamben writes: “The fierce mask left by a superficial
hagiography to a tradition that almost immediately forgot the reason for
the Comedy’s title is, in this sense, a comic mask.” The same might well
be said of Agamben himself: here he tells us, as directly as he can, how
he must be read. The very stiffness of Agamben’s Heidegger, his
Schmitt, his Aristotle, his homo sacer, his sovereign, his Arendt and
Foucault, and even his Benjamin and Dante and his Paul, the rigor mortis
that Agamben will never seek to cover over by reviving a living dialectic,
is not the stiffness of a death mask, the last trace and testament of a
departed life. Rather, it is the stiffness of comic personas, comic masks,
faithful to creaturely innocence in their very injustice and untruth. (Adler
2015: 89)
There is nevertheless a subtle yet significant difference in our approaches:
whereas Prozorov makes use of the comic as a kind of paradigm for understanding the
overarching logic of Agamben’s political thought, I draw attention to the comic as a
horizon from which to understand Agamben’s method, his literary and philosophical
practice.
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Prozorov’s approach has the virtue of offering an explicitly unifying and
systematic account of Agamben’s thought, the kernel of which is presented in the
penultimate chapter (“Outside of Being: Inoperative Humanity”). While Agamben’s comic
politics does depend on a concept of salvation, this salvation “introduces no new positive
content, nor does it restore positivity to the tradition that nihilism has already rendered
vacuous.” It is neither a Marxist political revolution leading to a new social order, nor a
Nietzschean overcoming of nihilism. Neither the reparation of what has been lost, nor the
resacralization of what has been profaned, it is the “irreparable loss of the lost, the definite
profanity of the profane” (Agamben 1993: 102; Prozorov 2014: 167). Hence, as Prozorov
explains: “To be saved as unsavable or irreparable is to be saved from the salvation
promised by the myriad of historical apparatuses that capture and dominate one’s animality
in order to perfect one’s humanity, to be let be in one’s being-thus, in the night of one’s
originary inoperativity” (Prozorov 2014: 167). This comic salvation ultimately involves
nothing less than an erasure of all the “signatures” that, according to Paracelsus, exist
throughout nature as “markers of original sin,” such that “phone and logos, zoe and bios,
Master and Slave, man and animal become indistinct” (Prozorov 2014: 174). This notion
of an “unmarked life” is “the culmination of the many strands of Agamben’s thought”:
inoperativity itself can be understood as the “deactivation of all signatures that assign a
being to this or that identity of function in various apparatuses of government” (Prozorov
2014: 174).
The main problem I have with Prozorov’s notion of “comic salvation” is that the
notion of the comic itself, regarded as an aesthetic and ultimately theological paradigm,
does not seem sufficient to conceive of an overcoming of the tragic. The comic involves
an inversion of the logic of tragedy, yet this inversion does not amount to an overcoming
of the teleology inherent to tragedy itself but simply involves switching from the negative
teleology of fate to the positive teleology of providence. Clearly, the notion of a “happy
ending” remains thoroughly teleological. The more radical dimension of comedy, then, is
not the “happy ending” as such, but the mood that permeates comedy. This mood is the
very opposite of Heideggerian anxiety: the fundamental mood in which being-towarddeath, being-toward-the-end, reveals itself. What characterizes the comic mood, above all,
is that nothing matters too much. Comedy involves a suspension of care—precisely that
which, for Heidegger, is of the very essence of being-in-the-world, and hence the horizon
through which the question of the meaning of being can be raised. The “happy ending,” by
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contrast, keeps the tragic logic in play, since it holds out the promise of happiness against
which alone tragic disappointment and despair is possible. What is more properly comic
about the comedy, however, is not the end, but the mood that permeates the whole: a sense
of levity and good humor; a feeling that everyone and everything is ridiculous, that the
very individuality of the individual is somehow itself fundamentally risible, yet that
nevertheless none of this really matters.
Prozorov is acutely aware of the complexity of the concept of comic, stressing
throughout that the comic is to be understood in the first instance as mood. Yet I would
argue that it is only by slipping between different senses of the comic that Prozorov can
provide a coherent account of Agamben’s soteriology. If comedy were simply a mood, it
would not seem to carry the historico-philosophical weight that Prozorov assigns to it. But
if it were a historico-theological paradigm—a way of understanding the “shape” of
history—then it seems like it would remain caught up in the teleological gesture of tragedy,
merely inverting it to transform pessimism into optimism. However, by conceiving of
comedy as at once both mood and paradigm, Prozorov can regard it as simultaneously the
end of the end, the end of every possible ending, and a “reversal of fortune” that consists
in nothing else than the opening up of history to fortune itself; a radical contingency that
falls completely outside the given order, and yet whose significance consists not in
changing anything at all, but only in the “slight displacement” that initiates the messianic
age, rendering inoperative even the machine of history itself.
If the comic offers the key to Agamben’s project, it is not as a “logically” or even
“paradoxologically” coherent capstone, but as a “master signifier” that conflates two
different senses that can never be brought together into a coherent picture. It is for this
reason, I would moreover argue, that Agamben does not do more with the comic; he sees
that it would involve a kind of trick. And there is good reason to suspect that Agamben
could not permit the comic qua mood to provide a guiding philosophical orientation.
Prozorov, in motivating his use of the Heideggerian notion of mood, invokes a telling
passage from the Idea of Prose:
[C]ourage, before which the imperfect nihilism of our times is in
constant retreat, would indeed consist in recognizing that we no longer
have moods, that we are the first men not to be in tune with a Stimmung.
[And] if moods are the same thing in the history of the individual as are
epochs in the history of humanity, then what presents itself in the leaden
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light of our apathy is the never yet seen sky of the absolute non-epochal
situation in human history. The unveiling of being and language, which
remains unsaid in each historical epoch and in each destiny, perhaps is
truly coming to an end. Deprived of an epoch, worn out and without
destiny, we reach the blissful threshold of our unmusical dwelling in
time. Our word has truly reached the beginning. (Agamben 1995: 91)
While noting that this passage speaks to “a radical discontinuity in our
contemporary condition,” Prozorov goes on to remark that this “actually provides us with
a glimpse into the fundamental mood of his philosophy” (Prozorov 2014: 12). I believe,
however, that Agamben’s claim that “we no longer have moods” needs to be taken more
seriously. We should hesitate to construe the absence of moods as a new kind of mood.
That the contemporary condition is characterized by a lack of mood is of such significance
for Agamben, I would argue, because it signals a discontinuity in the history of philosophy
demanding a radically new kind of method. The givenness of mood (together with
experience and gesture, which Agamben speaks of elsewhere in an analogous manner), and
with the epochal nature of history and thought, provides the basis for a phenomenological
method: the form of philosophical inquiry that remains possible when the critical project,
having run its course, has destroyed every other possible basis, including subjectivity,
reason, and absolute spirit. Nihilism remains imperfect if it holds on to the possibility of a
mood of nihilism, an experience of nihilism—or even a “gesture” of nihilism, a mode of
corporeal being proper to our nihilistic age. True philosophical courage demands that we
abandon even these last residues of stability.
Yet what kind of philosophy is possible when phenomenology is no longer
possible? Agamben’s answers to this question seems, in the first instance, to involve
rethinking mood (and experience) in a manner that deprives it of its metaphysical residue;
the residue of “propriety,” of an attachment to an ontology of ousia, that allows them to
remain thought of as moods and experiences proper to us. This strategy appears most
clearly in “Experimentum Linguae,” where Agamben cites Wittgenstein’s remark (made
during the only public lecture he would ever hold) that the “correct expression in language
for the miracle of the existence of the world, albeit as expressing nothing within language,
is the existence of language itself” (Agamben 2007: 10). Yet this approach, itself of a piece
with his account of potentiality and inoperativity and of the relation of being and language,
only makes the question of the contemporary possibility of philosophy even more critical.
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For it becomes clear that philosophy, if it is possible, can no longer be the proper
work of any one thinker; can no longer be authorized through a proper name. The individual
philosopher, the individual philosophy is always risible; if the philosophical tradition itself
is to be redeemed of its guilt, individual philosophers must assume the full measure of their
shame, coming to terms with the preposterousness of the move by which, trying to salvage
their truth from a general untruth, they have ended up merely repeating the fatal closure of
thought. This points us toward Agamben’s implicit method: a comic method that has little
to do either with a comic mood or with the comic paradigm of a “happy ending.” This
method consists in a complete and rigorous abandonment of the pretense of philosophical
originality and authorship. There is, in the strictest sense—a sense that the very institutional
structure of academic discourse must efface—no such thing as Agamben’s philosophy,
Agamben’s political thought: there are only other thinkers, who are so many comic masks,
reduced to an alienated exteriority—a mere pretension to an originality and singularity that
is always absent, yet a pretension that, given over to its shame, allows the tradition itself to
appear redeemed, transformed into the material of pure play, of a use without ownership.
Agamben is perhaps the first thinker, at least since the pre-Socratics, to have abandoned
the call to know oneself and think for oneself.
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